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Abstract
Adversarial examples are malicious inputs crafted
to induce misclassification. Commonly studied
sensitivity-based adversarial examples introduce
semantically-small changes to an input that result
in a different model prediction. This paper studies
a complementary failure mode, invariance-based
adversarial examples, that introduce minimal se-
mantic changes that modify an input’s true label
yet preserve the model’s prediction. We demon-
strate fundamental tradeoffs between these two
types of adversarial examples. We show that de-
fenses against sensitivity-based attacks actively
harm a model’s accuracy on invariance-based at-
tacks, and that new approaches are needed to re-
sist both attack types. In particular, we break state-
of-the-art adversarially-trained and certifiably-
robust models by generating small perturbations
that the models are (provably) robust to, yet that
change an input’s class according to human label-
ers. Finally, we formally show that the existence
of excessively invariant classifiers arises from the
presence of overly-robust predictive features in
standard datasets.
1. Introduction
Research on adversarial examples (Szegedy et al., 2013;
Biggio et al., 2013) is motivated by a spectrum of ques-
tions, ranging from the security of models in adversarial
settings (Tramèr et al., 2019), to limitations of learned rep-
resentations under natural distribution shift (Gilmer et al.,
2018). The broadest accepted definition of an adversarial
example is “an input to a ML model that is intentionally
designed by an attacker to fool the model into producing an
incorrect output” (Goodfellow & Papernot, 2017).
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Adversarial examples are commonly formalized as inputs
obtained by adding some perturbation to test examples to
change the model output. We refer to this class of malicious
inputs as sensitivity-based adversarial examples.
To enable concrete progress, the adversary’s capabilities are
typically constrained by bounding the size of the perturba-
tion added to the original input. The goal of this constraint
is to ensure that semantics of the input are left unaffected by
the perturbation. In the computer vision domain, `p norms
have grown to be a default metric to measure semantic sim-
ilarity. This led to a series of proposals for increasing the
robustness of models to sensitivity-based adversaries that
operate within the constraints of an `p ball (Madry et al.,
2017; Wong & Kolter, 2018; Raghunathan et al., 2018).
In this paper, we show that optimizing a model’s robustness
to `p-bounded perturbations is not only insufficient to resist
general adversarial examples, but also potentially harmful.
As `p distances are a crude approximation to the visual sim-
ilarity in a given task, over-optimizing a model’s robustness
to `p-bounded perturbations renders the model excessively
invariant to real semantics of the underlying task.
Excessive invariance of a model causes vulnerability against
invariance adversarial examples (Jacobsen et al., 2019).
These are perturbations that change the human-assigned
label of a given input but keep the model prediction un-
changed. For example in Figure 1 an MNIST image of a
digit ‘3’ is perturbed to be an image of a ‘5’ by changing
only 20 pixels; models that are excessively invariant do not
change their decision and incorrectly label both images as a
‘3’, despite the fact that the oracle label has changed.
This paper exposes a fundamental tradeoff between
sensitivity-based and invariance-based adversarial exam-
ples. We show that due to a misalignment between formal
robustness notions (e.g., `p-balls) and a task’s perceptual
metric, current defenses against adversarial examples cannot
prevent both sensitivity-based and invariance-based attacks,
and must trade-off robustness to each (see Figure 2). Worse,
we find that increasing robustness to sensitivity-based at-
tacks decreases a model’s robustness to invariance-based
attacks. We introduce new algorithms to craft `p-bounded
invariance-based adversarial examples, and illustrate the
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Oracle Decision-boundary“unrobust” decision boundary “robust” decision boundary
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Classified as: 5
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Classified as: 3
Excessively Sensitive Model Excessively Invariant Model
Figure 1: Decision boundaries near a real image of a digit ‘3’ and an invariance-based adversarial example labeled as ‘5’.
[Left]: Training a classifier without constraints may learn a decision boundary unrobust to sensitivity-based adversarial
examples. [Right]: Enforcing robustness to norm-bounded perturbations introduces erroneous invariance (dashed regions in
ε-spheres). We display real data here, the misclassified ‘5’ is an image found by our attack which resides within a typically
reported ε-region around the displayed ‘3’ (in the `0 norm). This excessive invariance of the robust model in task-relevant
directions illustrates how robustness to sensitivity-based adversarial examples can result in new model vulnerabilities.
above tradeoff on MNIST.1 We show that state-of-the-art
robust models disagree with human labelers on many of our
crafted invariance-based examples, and that the disagree-
ment rate is higher the more robust a model is. We find
that even models robust to very small perturbations (e.g.,
of `∞-norm below ε = 0.1) have higher vulnerability to
invariance attacks compared to undefended models.
We further break a provably-robust defense (Zhang et al.,
2019) with our attack. This model is certified to have 87%
test-accuracy (with respect to the MNIST test-labels) under
`∞-perturbations of radius ε = 0.4. That is, for 87% of test
inputs (x, y), the model is guaranteed to predict class y for
any perturbed input x′ that satisfies ‖x− x′‖∞ ≤ 0.4. Yet,
on our invariance-based adversarial examples that satisfy
this norm-bound, the model only agrees with human labelers
in 60% of the cases for an automated attack, and 12% of the
cases for manually-created examples—i.e., no better than
chance. The reason is that we can find perturbed inputs x′
that humans no longer classify the same way as x.
Code to reproduce our attacks is available at https://
github.com/ftramer/Excessive-Invariance.
Finally, we introduce a classification task where the tradeoff
between sensitivity and invariance can be studied rigorously.
We show that excessive sensitivity and invariance can be
tied respectively to the existence of generalizable non-robust
features (Jo & Bengio, 2017; Ilyas et al., 2019; Yin et al.,
2019) and to robust features that are predictive for stan-
dard datasets, but not for the general vision tasks that these
datasets aim to capture. Our experiments on MNIST show
that such overly-robust features exist. We further argue both
formally and empirically that data augmentation may offer
a solution to both excessive sensitivity and invariance.
1While MNIST can be a poor choice for studying adversarial
examples, we chose it because it is the only vision task for which
models have been made robust in non-negligible `p norm balls.
The fundamental tradeoff described in this paper will affect other
vision tasks once we can train strongly robust models on them.
2. Norm-bounded Sensitivity and Invariance
Adversarial examples
We begin by defining a framework to formally describe two
complementary failure modes of machine learning mod-
els, namely (norm-bounded) adversarial examples that arise
from excessive sensitivity or invariance of a classifier.
We consider a classification task with data (x, y) ∈ Rd ×
{1, . . . , C} from a distribution D. We assume the existence
of a labeling oracle O : Rd → {1, . . . , C} ∪ {⊥} that
maps any input in Rd to its true label, or to the “garbage
class” ⊥ for inputs x considered “un-labelable” (e.g., for a
digit classification task, the oracle O corresponds to human-
labeling of any image as a digit or as the garbage class).
Note that for (x, y) ∼ D, we always have y = O(x).2
The goal of robust classification is to learn a classifier f :
Rd → {1, . . . , C} that agrees with the oracle’s labels not
only in expectation over the distribution D, but also on any
rare or out-of-distribution inputs to which the oracle assigns
a class label—including adversarial examples obtained by
imperceptibly perturbing inputs sampled from D.
At its broadest, the definition of an adversarial example
encompasses any adversarially induced failure in a classi-
fier (Goodfellow & Papernot, 2017). That is, an adversarial
example is any input x∗ created such that f(x∗) 6= O(x∗).
This definition has proven difficult to work with, due to its
inherent reliance on the oracleO. As a result, it has become
customary to study a relaxation of this definition, which re-
stricts the adversary to applying a “small” perturbation to an
input x sampled from the distribution D. A common choice
2We view the support of D as a strict subset of all inputs in Rd
to which the oracle assigns a label. That is, there are inputs for
which humans agree on a label, yet that have measure zero in the
data distribution from which the classifier’s train and test inputs
are chosen. For example, the train-test data is often a sanitized and
normalized subset of natural inputs. Moreover, “unnatural” inputs
such as adversarial examples might never arise in natural data.
Fundamental Tradeoffs between Invariance and Sensitivity to Adversarial Perturbations
is to restrict the adversary to small perturbations under some
`p-norm. We call these “sensitivity adversarial examples”:
Definition 1 (Sensitivity Adversarial Examples). Given a
classifier f and a correctly classified input (x, y) ∼ D (i.e.,
O(x) = f(x) = y), an ε-bounded sensitivity adversarial
example is an input x∗ ∈ Rd such that:
1. f(x∗) 6= f(x).
2. ‖x∗ − x‖ ≤ ε.
The assumption underlying this definition is that perturba-
tions satisfying ‖x∗ − x‖ ≤ ε preserve the oracle’s labeling
of the original input x, i.e., O(x∗) = O(x).
A long line of work studies techniques to make classi-
fiers robust to norm-bounded sensitivity adversarial exam-
ples (Goodfellow et al., 2014; Madry et al., 2017). The
main objective is to minimize a classifier’s robust error
under ε-bounded perturbations, which is defined as:
Lε(f) = E
(x,y)∼D
[
max
‖∆‖≤ε
{f(x+ ∆) 6= y}
]
. (1)
We study a complementary failure mode to sensitivity adver-
sarial examples, called invariance adversarial examples (Ja-
cobsen et al., 2019). These correspond to (bounded) pertur-
bations that do not preserve an input’s oracle-assigned label,
yet preserve the model’s classification:
Definition 2 (Invariance Adversarial Examples). Given a
classifier f and a correctly classified input (x, y) ∼ D,
an ε-bounded invariance adversarial example is an input
x∗ ∈ Rd such that:
1. f(x∗) = f(x).
2. O(x∗) 6= O(x), and O(x∗) 6= ⊥.
3. ‖x∗ − x‖ ≤ ε.
If the assumption on sensitivity adversarial examples in Def-
inition 1 is met—i.e., all ε-bounded perturbations preserve
the label—then Definition 1 and Definition 2 correspond to
well-separated failure modes of a classifier (i.e., ε′-bounded
invariance adversarial examples only exist for ε′ > ε).
Our main contribution is to reveal fundamental trade-offs
between these two types of adversarial examples, that arise
from this assumption being violated. We demonstrate that
state-of-the-art robust classifiers do violate this assumption,
and (sometimes certifiably) have low robust error Lε(f) for
a norm-bound ε that does not guarantee that the oracle’s la-
bel is preserved. We show that these classifiers actually have
high “true” robust error as measured by human labelers.
Remarks. Definition 2 is a conscious restriction on a
definition of Jacobsen et al. (2019), who define an invari-
ance adversarial example as an unbounded perturbation that
changes the oracle’s label while preserving a classifier’s
ϵ* x*
x*
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 2: Illustration of distance-oracle misalignment. The
input space is (ground-truth) classified into the red solid
region, and the white dotted region. (a) A point at distance
ε∗ (under a chosen norm) of the oracle decision boundary.
(b) A model robust to perturbations of norm ε ≤ ε∗ (gray
circle) is still overly sensitive and can have adversarial ex-
amples x∗. (c) A model robust to perturbations of norm
ε > ε∗ (gray circle) has invariance adversarial examples x∗.
output at an intermediate feature layer. As we solely con-
sider the model’s final classification, considering unbounded
perturbations would allow for a “trivial” attack: given an
input x of class y, find any input of a different class that the
model misclassifies as y. (e.g., given an image of a digit 8,
an unbounded invariance example could be any unperturbed
digit that the classifier happens to misclassify as an 8).
Definition 2 presents the same difficulty as the original
broad definition of adversarial examples: a dependence on
the oracle O. Automating the process of finding invariance
adversarial examples is thus challenging. In Section 4.2, we
present some successful automated attacks, but show that a
human-in-the-loop process is more effective.
3. The Sensitivity and Invariance Tradeoff
In this section, we show that if the norm that is used to
define “small” adversarial perturbations is misaligned with
the labeling oracleO, then the robust classification objective
in equation 1 is insufficient for preventing both sensitivity-
based and invariance-based adversarial examples under that
norm. That is, we show that optimizing a model to attain
low robust error on perturbations of norm ε cannot prevent
both sensitivity and invariance adversarial examples.
We begin by formalizing our notion of norm-oracle mis-
alignment. The definition applies to any similarity metric
over inputs, of which `p-norms are a special case.
Definition 3 (Distance-Oracle Misalignment). Let dist :
Rd ×Rd → R be a distance measure (e.g., ‖x1 − x2‖). We
say that dist is aligned with the oracle O if for any input
x with O(x) = y, and any inputs x1, x2 such that O(x1) =
y, O(x2) 6= y, we have dist(x, x1) < dist(x, x2).
dist and O are misaligned if they are not aligned.
For natural images, `p-norms (or other simple metrics) are
clearly misaligned with our own perceptual metric. A con-
crete example is in Figure 3. This simple fact has deep
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 3: Visualization that `p norms fail to measure se-
mantic similarity in images. (a) original image in the
ImageNet validation set labeled as a goldfinch (top), hermit
crab (bottom); (b) semantic perturbation with a `2 pertur-
bation of 19 (respectively 22) that replaces the object of
interest with a pineapple (top), strawberry (bottom). (c)
random perturbation of the same `2-norm.
implications for the suitability of the robust classification
objective in equation 1. For an input (x, y) ∼ D, we define
the size of the smallest class-changing perturbation as:
ε∗(x) := min {‖∆‖ : O(x+ ∆) /∈ {y,⊥}} . (2)
Let x be an input where the considered distance function
is not aligned with the oracle. Let x2 = x + ∆ be the
closest input to x with a different class label, i.e., O(x2) =
y′ 6= y and ‖∆‖ = ε∗(x). As the distance and oracle are
misaligned, there exists an input x1 = x + ∆′ such that
‖∆′‖ > ε∗(x) and O(x1) = y. So now, if we train a model
to be robust (in the sense of equation 1) to perturbations of
norm bounded by ε ≤ ε∗(x), the model might misclassify
x1, i.e., it is sensitive to non-semantic changes. Instead,
if we make the classifier robust to perturbations bounded
by ε > ε∗(x), then x2 becomes an invariance adversarial
examples as the model will classify it the same way as x.
The two types of failure modes are visualized in Figure 2.
Lemma 4. Constructing an oracle-aligned distance func-
tion that satisfies Definition 3 is as hard as constructing a
function f so that f(x) = O(x), i.e., f perfectly solves the
oracle’s classification task.
The proof of this lemma is in Appendix D; at a high level,
observe that given a valid distance function that satisfies
Definition 3 we can construct a nearest neighbor classifier
that perfectly matches the oracle. Thus, in general we cannot
hope to have such a distance function.
4. Generating Invariance-based Adversarial
Examples on MNIST
We now empirically demonstrate and evaluate the trade-off
between sensitivity-based and invariance-based adversarial
Algorithm 1 Meta-algorithm for finding invariance-based
adversarial examples. For an input x, we find an input x∗ of
a different class in the dataset X , that is closest to x under
some set of semantics-preserving transformations. T .
GenInv (x, y,X , T )
S = {xˆ : (xˆ, yˆ) ∈ X , yˆ 6= y}
X ∗ = {t(xˆ) : t ∈ T , xˆ ∈ S}
return x∗ = arg minxˆ∈X∗ ‖xˆ− x‖
examples. We propose an algorithm for generating invari-
ance adversarial examples, and show that robustified models
are disparately more vulnerable to these attacks compared to
standard models. In particular, we break both adversarially-
trained and certifiably-robust models on MNIST by gener-
ating invariance adversarial examples—within the models’
(possibly certified) norm bound—to which the models’ as-
sign different labels than an ensemble of humans.
Why MNIST? We elect to study MNIST, the only dataset
for which strong robustness to various `p-bounded pertur-
bations is attainable with current techniques (Madry et al.,
2017; Schott et al., 2019). The dataset’s simplicity is what
initially prompted the study of simple `p-bounded perturba-
tions (Goodfellow et al., 2015). Increasing MNIST models’
robustness to such perturbations has since become a stan-
dard benchmark (Schott et al., 2019; Madry et al., 2017;
Wong & Kolter, 2018; Raghunathan et al., 2018). Due to
the existence of models with high robustness to various
`p-bounded attacks, robust classification on MNIST is con-
sidered close to solved (Schott et al., 2019).
This paper argues that, contrary to popular belief, MNIST
is far from being solved. We show why optimizing for
robustness to `p-bounded adversaries is not only insufficient,
but actively harms the performance of the classifier against
alternative invariance-based attacks.
In Section 4.3, we show that complex vision tasks (e.g.,
ImageNet) are also affected by the fundamental tradeoffs
we describe. These tradeoffs are simply not apparent yet,
because of our inability to train models with non-negligible
robustness to any attacks on these tasks.
4.1. Generating Model-agnostic Invariance-based
Adversarial Examples
We propose a model-agnostic algorithm for crafting invari-
ance adversarial examples. Our attack generates minimally
perturbed invariance adversarial examples that cause hu-
mans to change their classification.We then evaluate these
examples against multiple models. The rationale for this
approach is mainly that obtaining human labels is expensive,
which encourages the use of a single attack for all models.
The high-level algorithm we use is in Algorithm 1 and
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(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f-h)
Figure 4: Process for generating `0 invariant adversarial
examples. From left to right: (a) the original image of
an 8; (b) the nearest training image (labeled as 3), before
alignment; (c) the nearest training image (still labeled as 3),
after alignment; (d) the ∆ perturbation between the original
and aligned training example; (e) spectral clustering of the
perturbation ∆; and (f-h) candidate invariance adversarial
examples, selected by applying subsets of clusters of ∆ to
the original image. (f) is a failed attempt at an invariance ad-
versarial example. (g) is successful, but introduces a larger
perturbation than necessary (adding pixels to the bottom of
the 3). (h) is successful and minimally perturbed.
described below. It is simple, albeit tailored to datasets
where comparing images in pixel space is meaningful, like
MNIST.3
Given an input x, the attack’s goal is to find the smallest
class-changing perturbation x∗ = x + ∆ (c.f. equation 2)
such that O(x∗) 6= O(x). Typically, x∗ is not a part of the
dataset. We thus approximate x∗ via semantics-preserving
transformations of other inputs. That is, for the set S of
inputs of a different class than x, we apply transformations
T (e.g., small image rotations, translations) that are known
a-priori to preserve input labels. We then pick the trans-
formed input that is closest to our target point under the
considered `p metric. In Appendix A, we describe instanti-
ations of this algorithm for the `0 and `∞ norms. Figure 4
visualizes the sub-steps for the `0 attack, including an extra
post-processing that further reduces the perturbation size.
Measuring Attack Success. We refer to an invariance
adversarial example as successful if it causes a change in
the oracle’s label, i.e., O(x∗) 6= O(x). This is a model-
agnostic version of Definition 2. In practice, we simulate the
oracle by asking an ensemble of humans to label the point
x∗; if more than some fraction of them agree on the label
(throughout this section, 70%) and that label is different
from the original, the attack is successful. Note that success
or failure is independent of any machine learning model.
4.2. Evaluation
Attack analysis. We generate 100 invariance adversarial
examples on inputs randomly drawn from the MNIST test
set, for both the `0 and `∞ norms. Our attack is slow,
with the alignment process taking (amortized) minutes per
3Kaushik et al. (2019) consider a similar problem for NLP
tasks. They ask human labelers to produce “counterfactually-
augmented data” by introducing a minimal number of changes to
a text document so as to change the document’s semantics.
Attack Type Success Rate
Clean Images 0%
`0 Attack 55%
`∞, ε = 0.3 Attack 21%
`∞, ε = 0.3 Attack (manual) 26%
`∞, ε = 0.4 Attack 37%
`∞, ε = 0.4 Attack (manual) 88%
Table 1: Success rate of our invariance adversarial examples
in causing humans to switch their classification.
Figure 5: Our invariance-based adversarial examples. Top to
bottom: original images and our `0, `∞ at ε = 0.3 and `∞
at ε = 0.4 invariance adversarial examples. (left) successful
attacks; (right) failed attack attempts.
example. We performed no optimizations of this process
and expect it could be improved. The mean `0 distortion
of successful examples is 25.9 (with a median of 25). The
`∞ attack always uses the full budget of either ε = 0.3 or
ε = 0.4 and runs in a similar amount of time.
Human Study. We conducted a human study to evaluate
whether our invariance adversarial examples are indeed suc-
cessful, i.e., whether humans agree that the label has been
changed. We also hand-crafted 50 invariance adversarial
examples for the `0 and `∞ norm. The process was quite
simple: we built an image editor that lets us change images
at a pixel level under an `p constraint. One author then mod-
ified 50 random test examples in the way that they perceived
as changing the underlying class. We presented all these
invariance examples to 40 human evaluators. Each evaluator
classified 100 digits, half of which were unmodified MNIST
digits, and the other half were sampled randomly from our
`0 and `∞ invariance adversarial examples.
Results. Of 100 clean (unmodified) test images, 98 are
labeled identically by all human evaluators. The other 2
images were labeled identically by over 90% of evaluators.
Our `0 attack is highly effective: For 55 of the 100 examples
at least 70% of human evaluators labeled it the same way,
with a different label than the original test label. Humans
only agreed with the original test label (with the same 70%
threshold) on 34 of the images, while they did not form a
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Agreement between model and humans, for successful invariance adversarial examples
Model:1 Undefended `0 Sparse Binary-ABS ABS `∞ PGD ( = 0.3) `2 PGD ( = 2)
Clean 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 99%
`0 80% 38% 47% 58% 56%∗ 27%∗
`∞, ε = 0.3 33% 19%∗ 0% 14% 0% 5%∗
`∞, ε = 0.4 51% 27%∗ 8% 18% 16%∗ 19%∗
1 `0 Sparse: (Bafna et al., 2018); ABS and Binary-ABS: (Schott et al., 2019); `∞ PGD and `2 PGD: (Madry et al., 2017)
Table 2: Model accuracy with respect to the oracle human labelers on the subset of examples where the human-obtained
oracle label is different from the test label. Models which are more robust to perturbation adversarial examples (such as
those trained with adversarial training) tend to agree with humans less often on invariance-based adversarial examples.
Values denoted with an asterisks ∗ violate the perturbation threat model of the defense and should not be taken to be attacks.
When the model is wrong, it failed to classify the input as the new oracle label.
consensus on 18 examples. The simpler `∞ attack is less
effective: with a distortion of 0.3 the oracle label changed
21% of the time and with 0.4 the oracle label changed 37%
of the time. The manually created `∞ examples with distor-
tion of 0.4 were highly effective however: for 88% of the
examples, at least 70% assigned the same label (different
than the test set label). We summarize results in Table 1. In
Figure 5 we show sample invariance adversarial examples.
Our attack code, as well as our invariance examples and their
human-assigned labels are available at https://github.
com/ftramer/Excessive-Invariance.
To simplify the analysis below, we split our generated invari-
ance adversarial examples into two sets: the successes and
the failures, as determined by whether the plurality decision
by humans was different than or equal to the original label.
We only evaluate models on those invariance adversarial ex-
amples that caused the humans to switch their classification.
Model Evaluation. Given oracle ground-truth labels for
each of the images (as decided by humans), we report how
often models agree with the human-assigned label. Table 2
summarizes this analysis. For the invariance adversarial ex-
amples, we report model accuracy only on successful attacks
(i.e., those where the human oracle label changed between
the original image and the modified image).4 For these same
models, Table 3 in Appendix C reports the “standard” robust
accuracy for sensitivity-based adversarial examples, i.e., in
the sense of equation 1.
The models which empirically achieve the highest robust-
ness against `0 perturbations (in the sense of equation 1) are
the `0-Sparse classifier of Bafna et al. (2018), the Binary-
ABS model of Schott et al. (2019), and the `2-PGD ad-
4It may seem counter-intuitive that our `∞ attack with ε = 0.3
appears stronger than the one with ε = 0.4. Yet, given two
successful invariance examples (i.e., that both change the human-
assigned label), the one with lower distortion is expected to change
a model’s output less often, and is thus a stronger invariance attack.
versarially trained model (see Table 3 in the Appendix for
a comparison of the robustness of these models). Thus,
these are the models that are most invariant to perturbations
of large `0-norm. We find that these are the models that
achieve the lowest accuracy—as measured by the human
labelers—on our invariance examples. Moreover, all robust
models perform much worse than an undefended ResNet-
18 model on our invariance attacks. This includes models
such as the `∞-PGD adversarially trained model, which do
not explicitly aim at worst-case robustness against `0 noise.
Thus, we find that models that were designed to reduce ex-
cessive sensitivity to certain non-semantic features, become
excessively invariant to other features that are semantically
meaningful.
Similarly, we find that models designed for `∞ robustness
(Binary-ABS and `∞-PGD) also fare the worst on our `∞
invariance adversarial examples. Overall, all robust models
do worse than the undefended baseline. The results are
consistent for attacks with  = 0.3 and with  = 0.4, the
latter being more successful in changing human labels.
Note that the Binary-ABS defense of (Schott et al., 2019)
boasts 60% (empirical) robust accuracy on `∞-attacks with
ε = 0.4 (see (Schott et al., 2019)). Yet, on our our invariance
examples that satisfy this perturbation bound, the model
actually disagrees with the human labelers 92% of the time,
and thus achieves only 8% true accuracy on these examples.
Below, we make a similar observation for a certified defense.
Trading Perturbation-Robustness for Invariance-
Robustness. To better understand how robustness
to sensitivity-based adversarial examples influences
robustness to invariance attacks, we evaluate a range of
adversarially-trained models on our invariance examples.
Specifically, we trained `∞-PGD models with ε ∈ [0, 0.4]
and `1-PGD models (as a proxy for `0-robustness) with
ε ∈ [0, 15]. We verified that training against larger per-
turbations resulted in a monotonic increase in adversarial
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Figure 6: Higher noise-robustness leads to higher vulnera-
bility to invariance attacks. (left) For models trained with
`∞-PGD, a higher bound ε ∈ [0, 0.4] implies lower accu-
racy on `∞-bounded invariance examples. (right) Models
trained with `1-PGD evaluated on the `0 invariance attack.
robustness, in the sense of equation 1 (more details are in
Appendix C). We then evaluated these models against re-
spectively the `∞ and `0 invariance examples. Figure 6
shows that robustness to larger perturbations leads to higher
vulnerability to invariance-based examples.
Interestingly, while sensitivity-based robustness does not
generalize beyond the norm-bound on which a model is
trained (e.g., a model trained on PGD with ε = 0.3 achieves
very little robustness to PGD with ε = 0.4 (Madry et al.,
2017)), excessive invariance does generalize (e.g., a model
trained on PGD with ε = 0.2 is more vulnerable to our
invariance attacks with ε ≥ 0.3 compared to an undefended
model).
Breaking Certified Defenses. Our invariance attacks
even constitute a break of some certified defenses. For ex-
ample, Zhang et al. (2019) develop a defense which proves
that the accuracy on the test set is at least 87% under `∞
perturbations of size ε = 0.4. When we run their pre-trained
model on all 100 of our ε = 0.4 invariance adversarial ex-
amples (i.e., not just the successful ones) we find it has a
96% “accuracy” (i.e., it matches the original test label 96%
of the time). However, when we look at the agreement be-
tween this model’s predictions with the new labels assigned
by the human evaluators, the model’s accuracy is just 63%.
Thus, while the proof in the paper is mathematically correct
it does not actually deliver 87% robust accuracy under `∞-
attacks with ε = 0.4: humans change their classification for
many of these perturbations. Worse, for the 50 adversarial
examples we crafted by hand, the model disagrees with the
human ensemble 88% of the time: it has just 12% accuracy.
4.3. Natural Images
While our experiments are on MNIST, similar phenomena
may arise in other vision tasks. Figure 3 shows two per-
turbations of ImageNet images: the rightmost perturbation
is imperceptible and thus classifiers should be robust to it.
Conversely, the middle image was semantically changed,
and classifiers should be sensitive to such changes. Yet, the
`2 norm of both perturbations is the same. Hence, enforcing
robustness to `2-noise of some fixed size ε will necessarily
result in a classifier that is either sensitive to the changes on
the right, or invariant to the changes in the middle image.
Such a phenomenon will necessarily arise for any image
dataset that contains small objects, as perturbations of small
`2 magnitude will be sufficient to occlude the object, thereby
changing the image semantics.
This distance-oracle misalignment extends beyond the `2-
norm. For instance, Co et al. (2018) show that a perturbation
of size 16/255 in `∞ can suffice to give an image of a cat the
appearance of a shower curtain print, which are both valid
ImageNet classes. Yet, a random perturbation of the same
magnitude is semantically meaningless.
On CIFAR-10, some recent defenses are possibly already
overly invariant. For example, Shaeiri et al. (2020) and
Panda et al. (2019) aim to train models that are robust to `∞
perturbations of size  = 32/255. Yet, Tsipras et al. (2019)
show that perturbations of that magnitude can be semanti-
cally meaningful and can be used to effectively interpolate
between CIFAR-10 classes. The approach taken by Tsipras
et al. (2019) to create these perturbations, which is based
on a model with robustness to very small `∞ noise, may
point towards an efficient way of automating the generation
of invariance attacks for tasks beyond MNIST. The work
of Sharif et al. (2018) also shows that “small” `∞ noise
(of magnitude 25/255) can reliably fool human labelers on
CIFAR-10.
5. The Overly-Robust Features Model
The experiments in Section 4 show that models can be robust
to perturbations large enough to change an input’s semantics.
Taking a step back, it is not obvious why training such
classifiers is possible, i.e., why does excessive invariance not
harm regular accuracy. To understand the learning dynamics
of these overly-robust models, we ask two questions:
1. Can an overly-robust model fit the training data?
2. Can such a model generalize (robustly) to test data?
For simplicity, we assume that for every point (x, y) ∼ D,
the closest point x∗ (under the chosen norm) for which
O(x∗) 6= y is at a constant distance ε∗. We train a model f
to have low robust error (as in equation 1) for perturbations
of size ε > ε∗. This model is thus overly-robust.
We first ask under what conditions f may have low robust
training error. A necessary condition is that there do not
exist training points (xi, yi), (xj , yj) such that yi 6= yj and
‖xi − xj‖ ≤ ε. As ε is larger than the inter-class distance,
the ability to fit an overly robust model thus relies on the
training data not being fully representative of the space to
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which the oracle assigns labels. This seems to be the case in
MNIST: as the dataset consists of centered, straightened and
binarized digits, even an imaginary infinite-sized dataset
might not contain our invariance adversarial examples.
The fact that excessive robustness generalizes (as provably
evidenced by the model of Zhang et al. (2019)) points to a
deeper issue: there must exist overly-robust and predictive
features in the data—that are not aligned with human per-
ception. This mirrors the observations of (Ilyas et al., 2019),
who show that excessive sensitivity is caused by non-robust
yet predictive features. On MNIST, our experiments confirm
the existence of overly-robust generalizable features.
We formalize these observations using a simple classifica-
tion task inspired by (Tsipras et al., 2019). We consider a
binary task where unlabeled inputs x ∈ Rd+2 are sampled
from a distribution D∗k with parameter k:
z
u.a.r∼ {−1, 1}, x1 = z/2
x2 =
{
+z w.p. 1+1/k2
−z w.p. 1−1/k2
, x3, . . . , xd+2
i.i.d∼ N ( z√
d
, k) .
Here N (µ, σ2) is a normal distribution and k > 1 is a
constant chosen so that only feature x1 is strongly predictive
of the latent variable z (e.g., k = 100 so that x2, . . . , xd+2
are almost uncorrelated with z). The oracle is defined as
O(x) = sign(x1), i.e., feature x1 fully defines the oracle’s
class label, and other features are nearly uncorrelated with it.
Note that the oracle’s labels are robust under any `∞-noise
with norm strictly below ε = 1/2.
We model the collection of “sanitized” and labeled datasets
from a data distribution as follows: the semantic features
(i.e., x1) are preserved, while “noise” features have their
variance reduced (e.g., because non-standard inputs are
removed). Sanitization thus enhances “spurious correla-
tions” (Jo & Bengio, 2017; Ilyas et al., 2019) between non-
predictive features and class labels.5 We further assume that
the data labeling process introduces some small label noise.6
Specifically, the labeled data distribution D on which we
train and evaluate classifiers is obtained by sampling x from
a sanitized distribution D∗1+α (for a small constant α > 0)
where features x2, . . . , xd+2 are strongly correlated with
the oracle label. The label y is set to the correct oracle label
with high probability 1− δ. The consequences of this data
sanitization are two-fold (see Appendix E for proofs):
1. A standard classifier (that maximizes accuracy on D)
5In digit classification for example, the number of pixels above
1/2 is a feature that is presumably very weakly correlated with
the class 8. In the MNIST dataset however, this feature is fairly
predictive of the class 8 and robust to `∞-noise of size ε = 0.4.
6This technicality avoids that classifiers onD can trivially learn
the oracle labeling function. Alternatively, we could define feature
x1 so that is is hard to learn for certain classes of classifiers.
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Figure 7: Robust accuracy of models trained and evalu-
ated on an adversary combining a small spatial data aug-
mentation (rotation + translation) with an `∞ perturbation
bounded by ε.
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Figure 8: Model accuracy with respect to human labelers
on successful invariance adversarial examples of `∞-norm
bounded by 0.4. Models trained with data augmentation
agree more often with humans, and thus are less invariant to
semantically-meaningful changes.
agrees with the oracle with probability at least 1−δ, but
is vulnerable to `∞-perturbations of size ε = O(d−1/2).
2. There is an overly-robust model that only uses feature x2
and has robust accuracy 1− α/2 on D for `∞-noise of
size ε = 0.99. This classifier is vulnerable to invariance
attacks as the oracle is not robust to such perturbations.
The Role of Data Augmentation. This simple task sug-
gests a natural way to prevent the training of overly robust
models. If prior knowledge about the task suggests that clas-
sification should be invariant to features x2 . . . , xd+2, then
enforcing these invariances would prevent a model from
being robust to excessively large perturbations.
A standard way to enforce invariances is via data augmenta-
tion. In the above binary task, augmenting the training data
by randomizing over features x2, . . . , xd+2 would force the
model to rely on the only truly predictive feature, x1.
We experimented with aggressive data-augmentation on
MNIST. For values of ε ∈ [0, 0.4], we train models with
an adversary that rotates and translates inputs by a small
amount and then adds ε-bounded `∞-noise. This attacker
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mirrors the process we use to generate invariance adversar-
ial examples in Section 4. Thus, we expect it to be hard to
achieve robustness to attacks with large ε on this dataset,
as this requires the model to correctly classify inputs that
humans consider mislabeled. Figure 7 confirms this intu-
ition. As ε grows, it becomes harder to learn a model that
is invariant to both spatial data augmentation and `∞ noise.
We further find that the models trained with data augmenta-
tion agree more often with human labelers on our invariance
attacks (see Figure 8). Yet, even with data augmentation,
models trained against large `∞-perturbations still perform
worse than an undefended model. This simple experiment
thus demonstrates that while data-augmentation (over truly
invariant features) can help in detecting or preventing ex-
cessive invariance to semantic features, even though it is
not currently sufficient for training models that resist both
sensitivity-based and invariance-based attacks.
6. Discussion
Our results show that solely focusing on robustness to
sensitivity-based attacks is insufficient, as mis-specified
bounds can cause vulnerability to invariance-based attacks.
On `p-norm evaluations. Our invariance attacks are able
to find points within the `p-ball in which state-of-the-art
classifiers are (provably) robust. This highlights the need
for a more careful selection of perturbation bounds when
measuring robustness to adversarial examples. At the same
time, Figure 6 shows that even promoting robustness within
conservative bounds causes excessive invariance. The trade-
off explored in Section 3 suggests that aiming for robustness
against `p-bounded attacks may be inherently futile for mak-
ing models robust to arbitrary adversarial examples.
Trading Sensitivity and Invariance. We show that mod-
els that are robust to small perturbations make excessively
invariant decisions and are thus vulnerable to other attacks.
Interestingly, Engstrom et al. (2019a) show an opposite ef-
fect for models’ internal representations. Denoting the logit
layer of a model as z(x), they show that for robust models
it is hard to find inputs x, x∗ such that O(x) 6= O(x∗) and
z(x) ≈ z(x∗). Conversely, Sabour et al. (2016) and Jacob-
sen et al. (2019) show that excessive invariance of feature
layers is common in non-robust models. These observations
are orthogonal to ours as we study invariances in a model’s
classification layer, and for bounded perturbations. As we
show in Section 3, robustness to large perturbations under a
norm that is misaligned with human perception necessarily
causes excessive invariance of the model’s classifications
(but implies nothing about the model’s feature layers).
Increasing model robustness to `p-noise also leads to other
tradeoffs, such as reduced accuracy (Tsipras et al., 2019) or
reduced robustness to other small perturbations (Yin et al.,
2019; Tramèr & Boneh, 2019; Kang et al., 2019).
7. Conclusion
We have introduced and studied a fundamental tradeoff
between two types of adversarial examples, that stem either
from excessive sensitivity or invariance of a classifier. This
tradeoff is due to an inherent misalignment between simple
robustness notions and a task’s true perceptual metric.
We have demonstrated that defenses against `p-bounded
perturbations on MNIST promote invariance to semantic
changes. Our attack exploits this excessive invariance by
changing image semantics while preserving model decisions.
For adversarially-trained and certified defenses, our attack
can reduce a model’s true accuracy to random guessing.
Finally, we have studied the tradeoff between sensitivity and
invariance in a theoretical setting where excessive invariance
can be explained by the existence of overly-robust features.
Our results highlight the need for a more principled ap-
proach in selecting meaningful robustness bounds and in
measuring progress towards more robust models.
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A. Details about Model-agnostic
Invariance-based Attacks
Here, we give details about our model-agnostic invariance-
based adversarial attacks on MNIST.
Generating `0-invariant adversarial examples. As-
sume we are given a training set X consisting of labeled
example pairs (xˆ, yˆ). As input our algorithm accepts an
example x with oracle label O(x) = y. Image x with label
y = 8 is given in Figure 4 (a).
Define S = {xˆ : (xˆ, yˆ) ∈ X , xˆ 6= y}, the set of training
examples with a different label. Now we define T to be the
set of transformations that we allow: rotations by up to 20
degrees, horizontal or vertical shifts by up to 6 pixels (out
of 28), shears by up to 20%, and re-sizing by up to 50%.
We generate a new augmented training set X ∗ = {t(xˆ) :
t ∈ T , xˆ ∈ S}. By assumption, each of these examples
is labeled correctly by the oracle. In our experiments, we
verify the validity of this assumption through a human study
and omit any candidate adversarial example that violates
this assumption. Finally, we search for
x∗ = arg min
x∗∈X∗
‖x∗ − xˆ‖0.
By construction, we know that x and x∗ are similar in pixel
space but have a different label. Figure 4 (b-c) show this
step of the process. Next, we introduce a number of refine-
ments to make x∗ be “more similar” to x. This reduces
the `0 distortion introduced to create an invariance-based
adversarial example—compared to directly returning x∗ as
the adversarial example.
First, we define ∆ = |x − x∗| > 1/2 where the absolute
value and comparison operator are taken element-wise. In-
tuitively, ∆ represents the pixels that substantially change
between x∗ and x. We choose 1/2 as an arbitrary threshold
representing how much a pixel changes before we consider
the change “important”. This step is shown in Figure 4
(d). Along with ∆ containing the useful changes that are
responsible for changing the oracle class label of x, it also
contains irrelevant changes that are superficial and do not
contribute to changing the oracle class label. For example,
in Figure 4 (d) notice that the green cluster is the only se-
mantically important change; both the red and blue changes
are not necessary.
To identify and remove the superficial changes, we perform
spectral clustering on ∆. We compute ∆i by enumerating
all possible subsets of clusters of pixel regions. This gives us
many possible potential adversarial examples x∗i = x+ ∆i.
Notice these are only potential because we may not actually
have applied the necessary change that actually modifies the
class label.
We show three of the eight possible candidates in Figure 4.
In order to alleviate the need for human inspection of each
candidate x∗i to determine which of these potential adver-
sarial examples is actually misclassified, we follow an ap-
proach from Defense-GAN (Samangouei et al., 2018) and
the Robust Manifold Defense (Ilyas et al., 2017): we take
the generator from a GAN and use it to assign a likelihood
score to the image. We make one small refinement, and use
an AC-GAN (Mirza & Osindero, 2014) and compute the
class-conditional likelihood of this image occurring. This
process reduces `0 distortion by 50% on average.
As a small refinement, we find that initially filtering X
by removing the 20% least-canonical examples makes the
attack succeed more often.
Generating `∞-invariant adversarial examples. Our
approach for generating `∞-invariant examples follows sim-
ilar ideas as for the `0 case, but is conceptually simpler as
the perturbation budget can be applied independently for
each pixel (our `∞ attack is however less effective than the
`0 one, so further optimizations may prove useful).
We build an augmented training set X ∗ as in the `0 case.
Instead of looking for the closest nearest neighbor for some
example x with labelO(x) = y, we restrict our search to ex-
amples x∗ ∈ X ∗ with specific target labels y∗, which we’ve
empirically found to produce more convincing examples
(e.g., we always match digits representing a 1, with a target
digit representing either a 7 or a 4). We then simply apply
an `∞-bounded perturbation to x by interpolating with x∗,
so as to minimize the distance between x and the chosen
target example x∗.
Fundamental Tradeoffs between Invariance and Sensitivity to Adversarial Perturbations
B. Complete Set of 100 Invariance
Adversarial Examples
Below we give the 100 randomly-selected test images along
with the invariance adversarial examples that were shown
during the human study.
B.1. Original Images
B.2. `0 Invariance Adversarial Examples
B.3. `∞ Invariance Adversarial Examples (ε = 0.3)
B.4. `∞ Invariance Adversarial Examples (ε = 0.4)
Fundamental Tradeoffs between Invariance and Sensitivity to Adversarial Perturbations
Agreement between model and the original MNIST label, for sensitivity-based adversarial examples
Model: Undefended `0 Sparse Binary-ABS ABS `∞ PGD ( = 0.3) `2 PGD ( = 2)
`0 Attack ( = 25) 0% 45% 63% 43% 0% 40%
`∞ Attack ( = 0.3) 0% 8% 77% 8% 92% 1%
`∞ Attack ( = 0.4) 0% 0% 60% 0% 7% 0%
Table 3: Robust model accuracy with respect to the original MNIST labels under different threat models. For `∞ attacks, we
use PGD (Madry et al., 2017). For `0 attacks, we use the PointwiseAttack of (Schott et al., 2019).
C. Details on Trained Models
In Section 4, we evaluate multiple models against invariance
adversarial examples. Table 2 gives results for models taken
from prior work. We refer the reader to these works for
details. The undefended model is a ResNet-18.
Table 3 reports the standard test accuracy of these models
against sensitivity-based adversarial examples. That is, the
model is considered correct if it classifiers the adversarial
example with the original test-set label of the unperturbed
input. To measure `0 robustness, we use the PointwiseAt-
tack of (Schott et al., 2019) repeated 10 times, with  = 25.
For `∞ robustness, we use PGD with 100 iterations for
 = 0.3 and  = 0.4. For the ABS and Binary-ABS models,
we report the number from (Schott et al., 2019), for PGD
combined with stochastic gradient estimation.
Trading Perturbation-Robustness and Invariance Ro-
bustness. The adversarially-trained models in Figure 6
use the same architecture as (Madry et al., 2017). We train
each model for 10 epochs with Adam and a learning rate of
10−3 reduced to 10−4 after 5 epochs (with a batch size of
100). To accelerate convergence, we train against a weaker
adversary in the first epoch (with 1/3 of the perturbation
budget). For training, we use PGD with 40 iterations for
`∞ and 100 iterations for `1. For `∞-PGD, we choose a
step-size of 2.5 · ε/k, where k is the number of attack it-
erations. For the models trained with `1-PGD, we use the
Sparse `1-Descent Attack of Tramèr & Boneh (2019), with
a sparsity fraction of 99%.
Below, we report the robust accuracy of these models against
sensitivity-based adversarial examples, in the sense of equa-
tion 1.
 for `∞-PGD training
Attack 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
PGD  = 0.3 0% 6% 92% 93%
PGD  = 0.4 0% 0% 7% 90%
Table 4: Robust model accuracy with respect to the original
MNIST label for models trained against `∞ attacks.
 for `1-PGD training
Attack 5 10 15
`0-PointwiseAttack ( = 25) 41% 59% 65%
Table 5: Robust model accuracy with respect to the original
MNIST label for models trained against `1 attacks, and
evaluated against `0 attacks.
The Role of Data Augmentation. The models in Figure 7
and Figure 8 are trained against an adversary that first ro-
tates and translates an input (using the default parameters
from (Engstrom et al., 2019b)) and then adds noise of `∞-
norm bounded by ε to the transformed input. For training,
we sample 10 spatial transformations at random for each
input, apply 40 steps of `∞-PGD to each transformed input,
and retain the strongest adversarial example. At test time,
we enumerate all possible spatial transformations for each
input, and apply 100 steps of PGD to each.
When training against an adversary with ε ≥ 0.25, a warm-
start phase is required to ensure training converges. That is,
we first trained a model against an ε = 0.2 adversary, and
then successively increases ε by 0.05 every 5 epochs.
D. Proof of Lemma 4
We recall and prove Lemma 4 from Section 3:
Lemma. Constructing an oracle-aligned distance function
that satisfies Definition 3 is as hard as constructing a func-
tion f so that f(x) = O(x), i.e., f perfectly solves the
oracle’s classification task.
Proof. We first show that if we have a distance function
dist that satisfies Definition 3, then the classification task
can be perfectly solved.
Let x be an input from class y so that O(x) = y. Let
{xi} be any (possibly infinite) sequence of inputs so that
dist(x, xi) < dist(x, xi+1) but so that O(xi) = y for
all xi. Define lx = limi→∞ dist(x, xi) as the distance to
the furthest input from this class along the path xi.
Assume that O is not degenerate and there exists at least
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one input z so that O(z) 6= y. If the problem is degener-
ate then it is uninteresting: every function dist satisfies
Definition 3.
Now let {zi} be any (possibly infinite) sequence of inputs so
that dist(x, zi) > dist(x, zi+1) and so that O(zi) 6= y.
Define lz = limi→∞ dist(x, zi) as the distance to the
closest input along z. But by Definition 3 we are guaranteed
that lz > lx, otherwise there would exist an index I such that
dist(x, xI) ≥ dist(x, zI) but so that O(x) = O(xI)
and O(x) 6= O(zI), contradicting Definition 3. Therefore
for any example x, all examples xi that share the same class
label are closer than any other input z that has a different
class label.
From here it is easy to see that the task can be solved trivially
by a 1-nearest neighbor classifier using this function dist.
Let S = {(αi, yi)}Ci=1 contain exactly one pair (z, y) for
every class. Given an arbitrary query point x, we can there-
fore compute the class label as arg min dist(x, αi), which
must be the correct label, because of the above argument:
the closest example from any (incorrect) class is different
than the furthest example from the correct class, and so in
particular, the closest input from S must be the correct label.
For the reverse direction, assume we have a classifier f(x)
that solves the task perfectly, i.e., f(x) = O(x) for any
x ∈ Rd. Then the distance function defined as
dist(x, x′) =
{
0 if f(x) = f(x′)
1 otherwise
is aligned with the oracle.
E. Proofs for the Overly-Robust Features
Model
We recall the binary classification task from Section 5. Unla-
beled inputs x ∈ Rd+2 are sampled from some distribution
D∗k parametrized by k > 1 as follows:
z
u.a.r∼ {−1, 1}, x1 = z/2
x2 =
{
+z w.p. 1+1/k2
−z w.p. 1−1/k2
, x3, . . . , xd+2
i.i.d∼ N ( z√
d
, k) .
The oracle label for an input x is y = O(x) = sign(x1).
Note that for k  1, features x2, . . . , xd+2 are only weakly
correlated with the label y. The oracle labels are robust to
`∞-perturbations bounded by ε = 1/2:
Claim 5. For any x ∼ D∗ and ∆ ∈ Rd+2 with ‖∆‖∞ <
1/2, we have O(x) = O(x+ ∆).
Recall that we consider that a model is trained and evaluated
on sanitized and labeled data from this distribution. In this
data, the “noise” features x2, . . . , xd+2 are more strongly
correlated with the oracle labels y, and there is a small
amount of label noise attributed to mistakes in the data
labeling process. Specifically, we let α > 0 and δ > 0 be
small constants, and define D as the following distribution:
x ∼ D∗1+α, y =
{
+O(x) w.p. 1− δ
−O(x) w.p. δ .
We first show that this sanitization introduces spurious
weakly robust features. Standard models trained on D are
thus vulnerable to sensitivity-based adversarial examples.
Lemma 6. Let f(x) be the Bayes optimal classifier on
D. Then f agrees with the oracle O with probability at
least 1− δ over D but with 0% probability against an `∞-
adversary bounded by some ε = O(d−1/2).
Proof. The first part of the lemma, namely that f agrees
with the oracle O with probability at least 1 − δ follows
from the fact that for (x, y) ∼ D, sign(x1) = y with
probability 1 − δ, and O(x) = sign(x1). So a classifier
that only relies on feature x1 achieves 1 − δ accuracy. To
show that the Bayes optimal classifier for D has adversarial
examples, note that this classifier is of the form
f(x) = sign(wTx+ C)
= sign(w1 · x1 + w2 · x2 +
d+2∑
i=3
wi · xi + C) ,
where w1, w2, C are constants, and wi = O(1/
√
d) for i ≥
3. Thus, a perturbation of size O(1/
√
d) applied to features
x3, . . . , xd+2 results in a change of size O(1) in wTx+ C,
which can be made large enough to change the output of f
with arbitrarily large probability. As perturbations of size
O(1/
√
d) cannot change the oracle’s label, they can reduce
the agreement between the classifier and oracle to 0%.
Finally, we show that there exists an overly-robust classifier
on D that is vulnerable to invariance adversarial examples:
Lemma 7. Let f(x) = sign(x2). This classifier has ac-
curacy above 1− α/2 on D, even against an `∞ adversary
bounded by ε = 0.99. Under such large perturbations, f
agrees with the oracle with probability 0%.
Proof. The robust accuracy of f follows from the fact that
f(x) cannot be changed by any perturbation of `∞ norm
strictly below 1, and that for (x, y) ∼ D, we have x2 = y
with probability 1+1/(1+α)2 ≥ 1−α/2. For any (x, y) ∼ D,
note that a perturbation of `∞-norm above 1/2 can always
flip the oracle’s label. So we can always find a perturbation
∆ such that ‖∆‖∞ ≤ 0.99 and f(x+∆) 6= O(x+∆).
